We show that the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is classically at least as hard as standard worst-case lattice problems, even with polynomial modulus. Previously this was only known under quantum reductions.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, lattices have emerged as a very attractive foundation for cryptography. The appeal of latticebased primitives stems from the fact that their security can be based on worst-case hardness assumptions, that they appear to remain secure even against quantum computers, that they can be quite efficient, and that, somewhat surprisingly, for advanced tasks such as fully homomorphic encryption no other cryptographic assumption is known to suffice.
Virtually all recent lattice-based cryptographic schemes are based directly upon one of two natural average-case problems that have been shown to enjoy worst-case hardness guarantees: the short integer solution (SIS) problem and the learning with errors (LWE) problem. The former dates back to Ajtai's groundbreaking work [3] , who showed that it is at least as hard as approximating several worstcase lattice problems, such as the (decision version of the) shortest vector problem, known as GapSVP, to within a polynomial factor in the lattice dimension. This hardness result was tightened in followup work (e.g., [34] ), leading to a somewhat satisfactory understanding of the hardness of the SIS problem. The SIS problem has been the foundation for oneway [3] and collision-resistant hash functions [19] , identification schemes [35, 27, 22] , and digital signatures [18, 15, 11, 33, 28] .
Our focus in this paper is on the latter problem, learning with errors. In this problem our goal is to distinguish with some non-negligible advantage between the following two distributions:
((ai, ai, s + ei mod q)) i and ((ai, ui)) i , where s is chosen uniformly from Z n q and so are the ai ∈ Z n q , ui are chosen uniformly from Zq, and the "noise" ei ∈ Z is sampled from some distribution supported on small numbers, typically a (discrete) Gaussian distribution with standard deviation αq for α = o (1) .
The LWE problem has proved to be amazingly versatile, serving as the basis for a multitude of cryptographic constructions: secure public-key encryption under both chosenplaintext [44, 40, 26] and chosen-ciphertext [41, 37, 33] attacks, oblivious transfer [40] , identity-based encryption [18, 15, 1, 2] , various forms of leakage-resilient cryptography (e.g., [5, 8, 20] ), fully homomorphic encryption [14, 13, 12] (following the seminal work of Gentry [16] ), and much more. It was also used to show hardness of learning problems [24] . Contrary to the SIS problem, however, the hardness of LWE is not sufficiently well understood. The main hardness reduction for LWE [44] is similar to the one for SIS mentioned above, except that it is quantum. This means that the existence of an efficient algorithm for LWE, even a classical (i.e., non-quantum) one, only implies the existence of an efficient quantum algorithm for lattice problems. This state of affairs is quite unsatisfactory: even though one might conjecture that efficient quantum algorithms for lattice problems do not exist, our understanding of quantum algorithms is still at its infancy. It is therefore highly desirable to come up with a classical hardness reduction for LWE.
Progress in this direction was made by [37] (with some simplifications in the followup by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [30] ). The main result there is that LWE with exponential modulus is as hard as some standard lattice problems using a classical reduction. As that hardness result crucially relies on the exponential modulus, the open question remained as to whether LWE is hard for smaller moduli, in particular polynomial moduli. In addition to being an interesting question in its own right, this question is of special importance since many cryptographic applications, as well as the learning theory result of Klivans and Sherstov [24] , are instantiated in this setting. Some additional evidence that reducing the modulus is a fundamental question comes from the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem, which can be seen as LWE with modulus 2 (albeit with a different error distribution), and whose hardness is a long-standing open question. We remark that [37] does include a classical hardness of LWE with polynomial modulus, albeit one based on a non-standard lattice problem, whose hardness is arguably as debatable as that of the LWE problem itself.
To summarize, prior to our work, the existence of an efficient algorithm for LWE with polynomial modulus was only known to imply an efficient quantum algorithm for lattice problems, or an efficient classical algorithm for a nonstandard lattice problem. While both consequences are unlikely, they are arguably not as earth-shattering as an efficient classical algorithm for lattice problems. Hence, some concern about the hardness of LWE persisted, tainting the plethora of cryptographic applications based on it.
Main result. We provide the first classical hardness reduction of LWE with polynomial modulus. Our reduction is the first to show that the existence of an efficient classical algorithm for LWE with any subexponential modulus would indeed have earth-shattering consequences: it would imply an efficient algorithm for worst-case instances of standard lattice problems. Theorem 1.1 (Informal) Solving n-dimensional LWE with poly(n) modulus implies an equally efficient solution to a worst-case lattice problem in dimension √ n.
As a result, we establish the hardness of all known applications of polynomial-modulus LWE based on classical worstcase lattice problems, previously only known under a quantum assumption.
Techniques. Even though our main theorem has the flavor of a statement in computational complexity, its proof crucially relies on a host of ideas coming from recent progress in cryptography, most notably recent breakthroughs in the construction of fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
At a high level, our main theorem is a "modulus reduction" result: we show a reduction from LWE with large modulus q and dimension n to LWE with (small) modulus p = poly(n) and dimension n log 2 q. Theorem 1.1 now follows from the main result in [37] , which shows that the former problem with q = 2 n is as hard as n-dimensional GapSVP. We note that the increase in dimension from n to n log 2 q is to be expected, as it essentially preserves the number of possible secrets (and hence the running time of the naive brute-force algorithm).
Very roughly speaking, the main idea in modulus reduction is to map Zq into Zp through the naive mapping that sends any a ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} to pa/q ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1}. This basic idea is confounded by two issues. The first is that if carried out naively, this transformation introduces rounding artifacts into LWE, ruining the distribution of the output. We resolve this issue by using a more careful Gaussian randomized rounding procedure (Section 3). A second serious issue is that in order for the rounding errors not to be amplified when multiplied by the LWE secret s, it is essential to assume that s has small coordinates. A major part of our reduction (Section 4) is therefore dedicated to showing a reduction from LWE (in dimension n) with arbitrary secret in Z n q to LWE (in dimension n log 2 q) with a secret chosen uniformly over {0, 1}. This follows from a careful hybrid argument (Section 4.3) combined with a hardness reduction to the so-called "extended-LWE" problem, which is a variant of LWE in which we have some control over the error vector (Section 4.2).
We stress that even though our proof is inspired by and has analogues in the cryptographic literature, the details of the reductions are very different. In particular, the idea of modulus reduction plays a key role in recent work on fully homomorphic encryption schemes, giving a way to control the noise growth during homomorphic operations [14, 13, 12] . However, since the goal there is merely to preserve the functionality of the scheme, their modulus reduction can be performed in a rather naive way similar to the one outlined above, and so the output of their procedure does not constitute a valid LWE instance. In our reduction we need to perform a much more delicate modulus reduction, which we do using Gaussian randomized rounding, as mentioned above.
The idea of reducing LWE to have a {0, 1} secret also exists already in the cryptographic literature: precisely such a reduction was shown by Goldwasser et al. [20] who were motivated by questions in leakage-resilient cryptography. Their reduction, however, incurred a severe blow-up in the noise rate, making it useless for our purposes. In more detail, not being able to faithfully reproduce the LWE distribution in the output, they resort to hiding the faults in the output distribution under a huge independent fresh noise, in order to make it close to the correct one. The trouble with this "noise flooding" approach is that the amount of noise one has to add depends on the running time of the algorithm solving the target {0, 1}-LWE problem, which in turn forces the modulus to be equally big. So while in principle we could use the reduction from [20] (and shorten our proof by about a half), this would lead to a qualitatively much weaker result: the modulus and the approximation ratio for the worst-case lattice problem would both grow with the running time of the {0, 1}-LWE algorithm. In particular, we would not be able to show that for some fixed polynomial modulus, LWE is a hard problem; instead, in order to capture all polynomial time algorithms, we would have to take a super-polynomial modulus, and rely on the hardness of worst-case lattice problem to within super-polynomial approximation factors. In contrast, with our reduction, the modulus and the approximation ratio both remain fixed independently of the target {0, 1}-LWE algorithm.
As mentioned above, our alternative to the reduction in [20] is based on a hybrid argument combined with a new hardness reduction for the "extended LWE" problem, which is a variant of LWE in which in addition to the LWE samples, we also get to see the inner product of the vector of error terms with a vector z of our choosing. This problem has its origins in the cryptographic literature, namely in the work of O'Neill, Peikert, and Waters [36] on (bi)deniable encryption and the later work of Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [7] on key-dependent message security. The hardness reductions included in those papers are not sufficient for our purposes, as they cannot handle large moduli or error terms, which is crucial in our setting. We therefore provide an alternative reduction which is conceptually much simpler, and essentially subsumes both previous reductions. Our reduction works equally well with exponential moduli and correspondingly long error vectors, a case earlier reductions could not handle.
Broader perspective. As a byproduct of the proof of Theorem 1.1, we obtain several results that shed new light on the hardness of LWE. Most notably, our modulus reduction result in Section 3 is actually far more general, and can be used to show a "modulus expansion/dimension reduction" tradeoff. Namely, it shows a reduction from LWE in dimension n and modulus p to LWE in dimension n/k and modulus p k (see Corollary 3.4) . Combined with our modulus reduction, this has the following interesting consequence: the hardness of n-dimensional LWE with modulus q is a function of the quantity n log 2 q. In other words, varying n and q individually while keeping n log 2 q fixed essentially preserves the hardness of LWE.
Although we find this statement quite natural (since n log 2 q represents the number of bits in the secret), it has some surprising consequences. One is that n-dimensional LWE with modulus 2 n is essentially as hard as n 2 -dimensional LWE with polynomial modulus. As a result, n-dimensional LWE with modulus 2 n , which was shown in [37] to be as hard as n-dimensional lattice problems using a classical reduction, is actually as hard as n 2 -dimensional lattice problems using a quantum reduction. The latter is presumably a much harder problem, requiring exp( Ω(n 2 )) time to solve. This corollary highlights an inherent quadratic loss in the classical reduction of [37] (and as a result also our Theorem 1.1) compared to the quantum one in [44] .
A second interesting consequence is that 1-dimensional LWE with modulus 2 n is essentially as hard as n-dimensional LWE with polynomial modulus. The 1-dimensional version of LWE is closely related to the Hidden Number Problem of Boneh and Venkatesan [10] . It is also essentially equivalent to the Ajtai-Dwork-type [4] cryptosystem in [42] , as follows from simple reductions similar to the one in the appendix of [45] . Moreover, the 1-dimensional version can be seen as a special case of the Ring-LWE problem introduced in [31] (for ring dimension 1, i.e., ring equal to Z). This allows us, via the ring switching technique from [17] , to obtain the first hardness proof of Ring-LWE, with arbitrary ring dimension and exponential modulus, under the hardness of problems on general lattices (as opposed to just ideal lattice problems). In addition, this leads to the first hardness proof for the Ring-SIS problem [29, 39] with exponential modulus under the hardness of general lattice problems, via the standard LWE-to-SIS reduction. (We note that since both results are obtained by scaling up from a ring of dimension 1, the hardness does not improve as the ring dimension increases.)
A final interesting consequence of our reductions is that (the decision form of) LWE is hard with an arbitrary huge modulus, e.g., a prime; see Corollary 3.3. Previous results (e.g., [44, 37, 32, 33] ) required the modulus to be smooth, i.e., all its prime divisors had to be polynomially bounded.
Open questions. As mentioned above, our Theorem 1.1 inherits from [37] a quadratic loss in the dimension, which does not exist in the quantum reduction [44] nor in the known hardness reductions for SIS. At a technical level, this quadratic loss stems from the fact that the reduction in [37] is not iterative. In contrast, the quantum reduction in [44] as well as the reductions for SIS are iterative, and as a result do not incur the quadratic loss. We note that an additional side effect of the non-iterative reduction is that the hardness in Theorem 1.1 and [37] is based only on the worstcase lattice problem GapSVP (and the essentially equivalent BDD and uSVP [30] ), and not on problems like SIVP, which the quantum reduction of [44] and the hardness reductions for SIS can handle. One case where this is very significant is when dealing with ideal lattices, as in the hardness reduction for Ring-LWE, since GapSVP turns out to be an easy problem there.
We therefore believe that it is important to understand whether there exists a classical reduction that does not incur the quadratic loss inherent in [37] and in Theorem 1.1. In other words, is n-dimensional LWE with polynomial modulus classically as hard as n-dimensional lattice problems (as opposed to √ n-dimensional)? This would constitute the first full dequantization of the quantum reduction in [44] .
While it is natural to conjecture that the answer to this question is positive, a negative answer would be quite tantalizing. In particular, it is conceivable that there exists a (classical) algorithm for LWE with polynomial modulus running in time 2
. Due to the quadratic expansion in Theorem 1.1, this would not lead to a faster classical algorithm for lattice problems; it would, however, lead to a 2 O( √ n) -time quantum algorithm for lattice problems using the reduction in [44] . The latter would be a major progress in quantum algorithms, yet is not entirely unreasonable; in fact, a 2 O( √ n) -time quantum algorithm for a somewhat related quantum task was discovered by Kuperberg [25] (see also [43] ).
PRELIMINARIES
Let T = R/Z denote the cycle, i.e., the additive group of reals modulo 1. We also denote by Tq its cyclic subgroup of order q, i.e., the subgroup given by {0, 1/q, . . . , (q − 1)/q}.
For two probability distributions P, Q over some discrete domain, we define their statistical distance as |P (i) − Q(i)|/2 where i ranges over the distribution domain, and extend this to continuous distributions in the obvious way. We recall the following easy fact (see, e.g., [6, Eq. (2. 3)] for a proof).
Claim 2.1 If P and Q are two probability distributions such that P (i) ≥ (1 − ε)Q(i) holds for all i, then the statistical distance between P and Q is at most ε.
We will use the following immediate corollary of the leftover hash lemma [21] .
Lemma 2.2 Let k, n, q ≥ 1 be integers, and ε > 0 be such
n , u ← T k q , the distributions of (H, Hz) and (H, u) are within statistical distance at most ε.
A distinguishing problem P is defined by two distributions P0 and P1, and a solution to the problem is the ability to distinguish between these distributions. The advantage of an algorithm A with binary output on P is defined as
A reduction from a problem P to a problem Q is an efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithm A B that solves P given access to an oracle B that solves Q. Most of our reductions (in fact all except the one in Lemma 2.13) are what we call "transformation reductions:" these reductions perform some transformation to the input and then apply the oracle to the result.
Lattices
An n-dimensional (full-rank) lattice Λ ⊆ R n is the set of all integer linear combinations of some set of n linearly independent basis vectors B = {b1, . . . ,
The minimum distance (or first successive minimum) λ1(Λ) of a lattice Λ is the length of a shortest nonzero lattice vector, i.e., λ1(Λ) = min 0 =x∈Λ x . For an approximation ratio γ = γ(n) ≥ 1, the GapSVP γ is the problem of deciding, given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ = L(B) and a number d, between the case where λ1(L(B)) ≤ d and the case where λ1(L(B)) > γd. We refer to [23, 46] for a recent account on the computational complexity of GapSVP γ .
Gaussian measures
For r > 0, the n-dimensional Gaussian function ρr : R n → (0, 1] is defined as
We extend this definition to sets, i.e., ρr(A) = x∈A ρr(x) ∈ [0, +∞] for any A ⊆ R n . The (spherical) continuous Gaussian distribution Dr is the distribution with density function proportional to ρr. More generally, for a matrix B, we denote by D B the distribution of Bx where x is sampled from D1. When B is nonsingular, its probability density function is proportional to
A basic fact is that for any matrices B1, B2, the sum of a sample from D B 1 and an independent sample from D B 2 is distributed like
. For an n-dimensional lattice Λ and a vector u ∈ R n , we define the discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ+u,r as the discrete distribution with support on the coset Λ + u whose probability mass function is proportional to ρr. There exists an efficient procedure that samples within negligible statistical distance of any (not too narrow) discrete Gaussian distribution ([18, Theorem 4.1]; see also [38] ). In the next lemma, we modify this sampler so that the output is distributed exactly as a discrete Gaussian. This also allows us to sample from slightly narrower Gaussians. Strictly speaking, the lemma is not needed for our results, and we could use instead the original sampler from [18] . Using our exact sampler leads to slightly cleaner proofs as well as a (miniscule) improvement in the parameters of our reductions, and we include it here mainly in the hope that it finds further applications in the future.
Lemma 2.3
There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ = L(B), c ∈ R n , and a parameter r ≥ B · ln(2n + 4)/π, outputs a sample distributed according to DΛ+c,r.
Here, B denotes the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of B, and B is the length of the longest vector in it. We recall the definition of the smoothing parameter from [34] . We now collect some known facts on Gaussian distributions and lattices. Lemma 2.6 ([34, Lemma 4.1]) For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, ε > 0, r ≥ ηε(Λ), the distribution of x mod Λ where x ← Dr is within statistical distance ε/2 of the uniform distribution on cosets of Λ.
Lemma 2.8 ([44, Claim 3.9]) Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice, let u ∈ R n be arbitrary, let r, s > 0 and let t = √ r 2 + s 2 . Assume that rs/t = 1/ 1/r 2 + 1/s 2 ≥ ηε(Λ) for some ε < 1/2. Consider the continuous distribution Y on R n obtained by sampling from DΛ+u,r and then adding a noise vector taken from Ds. Then, the statistical distance between Y and Dt is at most 4ε.
Lemma 2.9 ([44, Corollary 3.10]) Let Λ be an ndimensional lattice, let u, z ∈ R n be arbitrary, and let r, α > 0. Assume that (1/r 2 + ( z /α) 2 ) −1/2 ≥ ηε(Λ) for some ε < 1/2. Then the distribution of z, v + e where v ← DΛ+u,r and e ← Dα, is within statistical distance 4ε of D β for β = (r z ) 2 + α 2 .
, s > 0 be such that s ≥ ηε(Λ) for some ε ≤ 1/2. Then if we choose x from the continuous Gaussian Dr and then choose y from the discrete Gaussian DΛ−x,s then x + y is within statistical distance 8ε of the discrete Gaussian D Λ,(r 2 +s 2 ) 1/2 .
Learning with Errors
For integers n, q ≥ 1, an integer vector s ∈ Z n , and a probability distribution φ on R, let A q,s,φ be the distribution over T n q × T obtained by choosing a ∈ T n q uniformly at random and an error term e from φ, and outputting the pair (a, b = a, s + e) ∈ T n q × T. Definition 2.11 For integers n, q ≥ 1, an error distribution φ over R, and a distribution D over Z n , the (averagecase) decision variant of the LWE problem, denoted LWE n,q,φ (D), is to distinguish given arbitrarily many independent samples, the uniform distribution over T n q × T from A q,s,φ for a fixed s sampled from D. The variant where the algorithm only gets a bounded number of samples m ∈ N is denoted LWE n,m,q,φ (
D).
Notice that the distribution A q,s,φ only depends on s mod q, and so one can assume without loss of generality that s ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} n . Moreover, using a standard random self-reduction, for any distribution over secrets D, one can reduce LWE n,q,φ (D) to LWE n,q,φ (U ({0, . . . , q − 1} n )), and we will occasionally use LWE n,q,φ to denote the latter (as is common in previous work). When the noise is a Gaussian with parameter α > 0, i.e., φ = Dα, we use the shorthand LWEn,q,α(D). We note that by discretizing the error using Lemma 2.10 and using the so-called "normal form" of LWE (see [8] ), one can efficiently reduce LWEn,q,α to LWEn,q,α(D) where D is the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z n , √ 2αq , as long as αq ≥ √ n. Finally, since the case when D is uniform over {0, 1}
n plays an important role in this paper, we will denote it by binLWE n,q,φ (and by binLWE n,m,q,φ when the algorithm only gets m samples).
Unknown (Bounded) Noise Rate. We also consider a variant of LWE in which the amount of noise is some unknown β ≤ α (as opposed to exactly α), with β possibly depending on the secret s. As the following lemma shows, this does not make the problem significantly harder. Definition 2.12 For integers n, q ≥ 1 and α ∈ (0, 1), LWE n,q,≤α is the problem of solving LWE n,q,β for any β = β(s) ≤ α. Lemma 2.13 Let A be an algorithm for LWEn,m,q,α with advantage at least ε > 0. Then there exists an algorithm B for LWE n,m ,q,≤α using oracle access to A and with advantage ≥ 1/3, where both m and its running time are poly(m, 1/ε, n, log q).
The proof is standard (see, e.g., [44, Lemma 3.7] for the analogous statement for the search version of LWE). The idea is to use Chernoff bound to estimate A's success probability on the uniform distribution, and then add noise in small increments to our given distribution and estimate A's behavior on the resulting distributions. If there is a gap between any of these and the uniform behavior, the input distribution is deemed non-uniform. The full proof is omitted.
Relation to Lattice Problems. Regev [44] and Peikert [37] showed quantum and classical reductions (respectively) from the worst-case hardness of the GapSVP problem to the search version of LWE. (We note that the quantum reduction in [44] also shows a reduction from SIVP.) As mentioned in the introduction, the classical reduction only works when the modulus q is exponential in the dimension n. This is summarized in the following theorem, which is derived from [44, Theorem 3.1] and [37, Theorem 3.1].
Theorem 2.14 Let n, q ≥ 1 be integers and let α ∈ (0, 1) be such that αq ≥ 2 √ n. Then there exists a quantum reduction from worst-case n-dimensional GapSVP O(n/α) to LWEn,q,α.
If in addition q ≥ 2 n/2 then there is also a classical reduction between those problems.
In order to obtain hardness of the decision version of LWE, which is the one we consider throughout the paper, one employs a search-to-decision reduction. Several such reductions appear in the literature (e.g., [44, 37, 33] ). The most recent reduction by Micciancio and Peikert [33] , which essentially subsumes all previous reductions, requires the modulus q to be smooth. Below we give the special case when the modulus is a power of 2, which suffices for our purposes. It follows from our results that (decision) LWE is hard not just for a smooth modulus q, as follows from [33] , but actually for all moduli q, including prime moduli, with only a small deterioration in the noise (see Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3).
Theorem 2.15 (Special case of [33, Theorem 3.1])
Let q be a power of 2, and α satisfy 1/q < α < 1/ω( √ log n). Then there exists an efficient reduction from search LWEn,q,α to (decision) LWE n,q,α for α = α · ω(log n).
MODULUS-DIMENSION SWITCHING
The main results of this section are Corollaries 3.2 and 3.4 below. Both are special cases of the following technical theorem. We say that a distribution D over Z n is (B, δ)-bounded for some reals B, δ ≥ 0 if the probability that x ← D has norm greater than B is at most δ. Theorem 3.1 Let m, n, n , q, q ≥ 1 be integers, let G ∈ Z n ×n be such that the lattice Λ = 1 q G T Z n + Z n has a known basis B, and let D be an arbitrary (B, δ)-bounded distribution over Z n . Let α, β > 0 and ε ∈ (0, 1/2) satisfy
Then there is an efficient (transformation) reduction from LWE n,m,q,≤α (D) to LWE n ,m,q ,≤β (G · D) that reduces the advantage by at most δ + 14εm.
Here we use the notation B from Lemma 2.3. We also note that if needed, the distribution on secrets produced by the reduction can always be turned into the uniform distribution on Z n q , as mentioned after Definition 2.11. Also, we recall that there exists an elementary reduction from LWE n ,q ,≤β to LWE n ,q ,β (see Lemma 2.13).
Here we state two important corollaries of the theorem. The first corresponds to just modulus reduction (the LWE dimension is preserved), and is obtained by letting n = n, G = I be the n-dimensional identity matrix, and B = I/q . For example, we can take q ≥ q ≥ 2 ln(2n(1 + 1/ε)) · (B/α) and β = √ 2α, which corresponds to reducing an arbitrary modulus to almost B/α, while increasing the initial error rate α by just a small constant factor.
Corollary 3.2 For any
there is an efficient reduction from LWE n,m,q,≤α (D) to LWE n,m,q ,≤β (D) that reduces the advantage by at most δ + 14εm.
In particular, by using the normal form of LWE, in which the secret has distribution D = D Z n ,αq , we can switch to a power-of-2 modulus with only a small loss in the noise rate, as described in the following corollary. Together with the known search-to-decision reduction (Theorem 2.15), this extends the known hardness of (decision) LWE to any modulus q. Here we use that D = D Z n ,r is (Cr n log(n/δ), δ)-bounded for some universal constant C > 0, which follows by taking union bound over the n coordinates. (Alternatively, one could use that it is (r √ n, 2 −n )-bounded, as follows from [9, Lemma 1.5], leading to a slightly tighter statement for large n.) Corollary 3.3 Let α > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2), m ≥ n ≥ 1, q ≥ 1, and let q ∈ [q , 2q ) be the smallest power of 2 not smaller than q . There exists an efficient (transformation) reduction from LWE n,m,q,≤α to LWE n,m,q ,≤β where β = Cα √ n log(n/δ) log(nm/δ) for some universal constant C > 0, losing at most δ in the advantage.
Another corollary illustrates a modulus-dimension tradeoff. Assume n = kn for some k ≥ 1, and let q = q k . Let G = I n ⊗ g, where g = (1, q, q 2 , . . . ,
A basis of Λ is given by
this is since the column vectors of B belong to Λ and the determinants match. Orthogonalizing from left to right, we have B = q −1 I and so B = q −1 . We therefore obtain the following corollary, showing that we can trade off the dimension against the modulus, holding n log q = n log q fixed. For example, letting D = D Z n ,αq (corresponding to a secret in normal form), which is (αq √ n, 2 −n )-bounded, the reduction increases the error rate by about a √ n factor.
there is an efficient reduction from LWE n,m,q,≤α (D) to LWE n/k,m,q k ,≤β (G·D) that reduces the advantage by at most δ + 14εm, where G = I n/k ⊗ (1, q, q 2 , . . . , q k−1 ) T .
Theorem 3.1 follows immediately from the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5 Adopt the notation of Theorem 3.1, and let
There is an efficient mapping from T n q × T to T n q × T, which has the following properties:
• If the input is uniformly random, then the output is within statistical distance 4ε from the uniform distribution.
• If the input is distributed according to Aq,s,D α for some s ∈ Z n with s ≤ B, then the output distribution is within statistical distance 10ε from A q ,Gs,D α , where
Proof. The main idea behind the reduction is to encode T n q into T n q , so that the mod-1 inner products between vectors in T n q and a short vector s ∈ Z n , and between vectors in T n q and Gs ∈ Z n , are nearly equivalent. In a bit more detail, the reduction will map its input vector a ∈ T n q (from the given LWE-or-uniform distribution) to a vector a ∈ T n q , so that
for any (unknown) s ∈ Z n . To do this, it randomly samples a so that G T a ≈ a mod Z n , where the approximation error will be a discrete Gaussian of parameter r.
We can now formally define the reduction, which works as follows. On an input pair (a, b) ∈ T n q × T, it does the following:
• Choose f ← DΛ−a,r using Lemma 2.3 with basis B,
Choose a uniformly random solution a ∈ T n q to the equation G T a = v mod Z n . This can be done by computing a basis of the solution set G T a = 0 mod Z n , and adding a uniform element from that set to an arbitrary solution to the equation
• Choose e ← DrB and let b = b + e ∈ T.
• Output (a , b ).
We now analyze the reduction. First, if the distribution of the input is uniform, then it suffices to show that a is (nearly) uniformly random, because both b and e are independent of a , and b ∈ T is uniform. To prove this claim, notice that it suffices to show that the coset v ∈ Λ/Z n is (nearly) uniformly random, because each v has the same number of solutions a to G T a = v mod Z n . Next, observe that for anyā ∈ T n q andf ∈ Λ −ā, we have by Lemma 2.7 (using that r ≥ ηε(Λ) by Lemma 2.5) that
where C = q −n /ρr(Λ) is a normalizing value that does not depend onā orf . Therefore, by summing over allā,f satisfyingā +f =v, we obtain that for anyv ∈ Λ/Z n ,
Since r ≥ ηε(q −1 Z n ) (by Lemma 2.5), Lemma 2.7 implies that Pr[v =v] ∈ 1−ε 1+ε , 1+ε 1−ε C for a constant C that is independent ofv. By Claim 2.1, this shows that a is within statistical distance 1 − ((1 − ε)/(1 + ε)) 2 ≤ 4ε of the uniform distribution.
It remains to show that the reduction maps Aq,s,D α to A q ,Gs,D β . Let the input sample from the former distribution be (a, b = a, s + e), where e ← Dα. As argued above, the output a is (nearly) uniform over T n q . So condition now on any fixed value a ∈ T n q of a , and letv = G T a mod Z n . We have b = a, s + e + e = a , Gs + e + −f , s + e mod 1.
By Claim 2.1 and (3.1) (and noting that if f =f then a =v −f mod Z n ), the distribution of −f is within sta-
HARDNESS OF LWE WITH BINARY SE-CRET
The following is the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.1 Let k, q ≥ 1, and m ≥ n ≥ 1 be integers, and let ε ∈ (0, 1/2), α, δ > 0, be such that n ≥ (k + 1) log 2 q + 2 log 2 (1/δ), α ≥ ln(2n(1 + 1/ε))/π/q. There exist three (transformation) reductions from LWE k,m,q,α to binLWE n,m,q,≤ √ 10nα , such that for any algorithm for the latter problem with advantage ζ, at least one of the reductions produces an algorithm for the former problem with advantage at least
By combining Theorem 4.1 with the reduction in Corollary 3.2 (and noting that {0, 1} n is ( √ n, 0) bounded), we can replace the binLWE problem above with binLWE n,m,q ,β for any q ≥ 1 and ξ > 0 where
, while decreasing the advantage in (4.1) by 14ξm. Recalling that LWE of dimension k = √ n and modulus q = 2
(assume k is even) is known to be classically as hard as √ ndimensional lattice problems (Theorems 2.14 and 2.15), this gives a formal statement of Theorem 1.1. The modulus q can be taken almost as small as √ n. For most purposes the sum over prime factors of q in (4.1) is negligible. For instance, in deriving the formal statement of Theorem 1.1 above, we used a q that is a power of 2, in which case the sum is 2 −k−1 = 2 − √ n−1 , which is negligible. If needed, one can improve this by applying the modulus switching reduction (Corollary 3.3) before applying Theorem 4.1 in order to make q prime. (Strictly speaking, one also needs to apply Lemma 2.13 to replace the "unknown noise" variant of LWE given by Corollary 3.3 with the fixed noise variant.) This improves the advantage loss to q
which is roughly 2 −n . In a high level, the proof of the theorem follows by combining three main steps. The first, given in Section 4.1, reduces LWE to a variant in which the first equation is errorless. The second, given in Section 4.2, reduces the latter to the intermediate problem extLWE, another variant of LWE in which some information on the noise elements is leaked. Finally, in Section 4.3, we reduce extLWE to LWE with {0, 1} secret. We note that the first reduction is relatively standard; it is the other two that we consider as the main contribution of this section. We now proceed with more details.
Proof. First, since m ≥ n, Lemma 4.3 provides a transformation reduction from LWE k,m,q,α to first-is-errorless LWE k+1,n,q,α , while reducing the advantage by at most 2 −k+1 . Next, Lemma 4.7 with Z = {0, 1} n , which is of quality ξ = 2 by Claim 4.6, reduces the latter problem to extLWE k+1,n,q, √ 5α,{0,1} n while reducing the advantage by at most 33ε/2. Then, Lemma 4.8 reduces the latter problem to extLWE m k+1,n,q, √ 5α,{0,1} n , while losing a factor of m in the advantage. Finally, Lemma 4.9 provides three reductions to binLWE n,m,q,≤ √ 10nα : two from the latter problem, and one from LWE k+1,m,q, √ 5nα , guaranteeing that the sum of advantages is at least the original advantage minus 4mε+δ. Together with the trivial reduction from LWE k,m,q,α to LWE k+1,m,q, √ 5nα (which incurs no loss in advantage), this completes the proof.
First-is-errorless LWE
We first define a variant of LWE in which the first equation is given without error, and then show in Lemma 4.3 that it is still hard. Definition 4.2 For integers n, q ≥ 1 and an error distribution φ over R, the "first-is-errorless" variant of the LWE problem is to distinguish between the following two scenarios. In the first, the first sample is uniform over T n q × T q and the rest are uniform over T n q × T. In the second, there is an unknown uniformly distributed s ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}
n , the first sample we get is from A q,s,{0} (where {0} denotes the distribution that is deterministically zero) and the rest are from A q,s,φ . Lemma 4.3 For any n ≥ 2, m, q ≥ 1, and error distribution φ, there is an efficient (transformation) reduction from LWE n−1,m,q,φ to the first-is-errorless variant of LWE n,m,q,φ that reduces the advantage by at most p p −n , with the sum going over all prime factors of q.
Notice that if q is prime the loss in advantage is at most q −n . Alternatively, for any number q we can bound it by
which might be good enough when n is large.
Proof. The reduction starts by choosing a vector a uniformly at random from {0, . . . , q −1} n . Let r be the greatest common divisor of the coordinates of a . If it is not coprime to q, we abort. The probability that this happens is at most
Assuming we do not abort, we proceed by finding a matrix U ∈ Z n×n that is invertible modulo q and whose leftmost column is a . Such a matrix exists, and can be found efficiently. For instance, using the extended GCD algorithm, we find an n × n unimodular matrix R such that Ra = (r, 0, . . . , 0)
T . Then R −1 · diag(r, 1, . . . , 1) is the desired matrix. We also pick a uniform element s0 ∈ {0, . . . , q− 1}. The reduction now proceeds as follows. The first sample it outputs is (a /q, s0/q). The remaining samples are produced by taking a sample (a, b) from the given oracle, picking a fresh uniformly random d ∈ Tq, and outputting (U(d|a), b + (s0 · d)) with the vertical bar denoting concatenation. It is easy to verify correctness: given uniform samples, the reduction outputs uniform samples (with the first sample's b component uniform over Tq), up to statistical distance 2 −n+1 ; and given samples from A q,s,φ , the reduction outputs one sample from A q,s ,{0} and the remaining samples from A q,s ,φ , up to statistical distance 2 −n+1 , where s = (U −1 ) T (s0|s) mod q. This proves correctness since U, being invertible modulo q, induces a bijection on Z n q , and so s is uniform in {0, . . . , q − 1} n .
Extended LWE
We next define the intermediate problem extLWE. (This definition is of an easier problem than the one considered in previous work [7] , which makes our hardness result stronger.) The algorithm gets to choose z ∈ Z and then receives a tuple
Its goal is to distinguish between the following two cases.
In the first, A ∈ T n×m q is chosen uniformly, ei ∈ When t = 1, we omit the superscript t. Also, when χ is D q −1 Z m ,α for some α > 0, we replace the subscript χ by α. We note that a discrete version of LWE can be defined as a special case of extLWE by setting Z = {0 m }. We next define a measure of quality of sets Z. Definition 4.5 For a real ξ > 0 and a set Z ⊆ Z m we say that Z is of quality ξ if given any z ∈ Z, we can efficiently find a unimodular matrix U ∈ Z m×m such that if U ∈ Z m×(m−1) is the matrix obtained from U by removing its leftmost column then all of the columns of U are orthogonal to z and its largest singular value is at most ξ.
The idea in this definition is that the columns of U form a basis of the lattice of integer points that are orthogonal to z, i.e., the lattice {b ∈ Z m : b, z = 0}. The quality measures how "short" we can make this basis.
m is of quality 2.
Proof. Let z ∈ Z and assume without loss of generality that its first k ≥ 1 coordinates are 1 and the remaining m − k are 0. Then consider the upper bidiagonal matrix U whose diagonal is all 1s and whose diagonal above the main diagonal is (−1, . . . , −1, 0, . . . , 0) with −1 appearing k − 1 times. The matrix is clearly unimodular and all the columns except the first one are orthogonal to z. Moreover, by the triangle inequality, we can bound the operator norm of U by the sum of that of the diagonal 1 matrix and the off-diagonal matrix, both of which clearly have norm at most 1.
Lemma 4.7 Let Z ⊆ Z m be of quality ξ > 0. Then for any n, q ≥ 1, ε ∈ (0, 1/2), and α, r ≥ (ln(2m(1 + 1/ε))/π) 1/2 /q, there is a (transformation) reduction from the first-is-errorless variant of LWEn,m,q,α to extLWE n,m,q,(α 2 ξ 2 +r 2 ) 1/2 ,Z that reduces the advantage by at most 33ε/2.
Proof. We first describe the reduction. Assume we are asked to provide samples for some z ∈ Z. We compute a unimodular U ∈ Z m×m for z as in Definition 4.5, and let U ∈ Z m×(m−1) be the matrix formed by removing the first column of U. We then take m samples from the given distribution, resulting in (A, b) ∈ T n×m q × (T q × T m−1 ). We also sample a vector f from the m-dimensional continuous Gaussian distribution D α(ξ 2 I−U U T ) 1/2 , which is well defined since ξ 2 I − U U T is a positive semidefinite matrix by our assumption on U. The output of the reduction is the tuple
where b = Ub + f , and c is chosen from the discrete Gaussian distribution D q −1 Z m −b ,r (using Lemma 2.3). (As before, notice that the coset q
We now prove the correctness of the reduction. Consider first the case that we get valid LWE equations, i.e., A is uniform in T n×m q and b = A T s + e ∈ T m where s ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} n is uniformly chosen, the first coordinate of e ∈ R m is 0, and the remaining m − 1 coordinates are chosen from Dα. Since U is unimodular, A = AU T is uniformly distributed in T n×m q as required. From now on we condition on an arbitrary A and analyze the distribution of the remaining two components of (4.2). Next,
Since Ue is distributed as a continuous Gaussian D αU , the vector Ue+f is a distributed as a spherical continuous Gaussian
, so we can see c as being chosen from D q −1 Z m −(Ue+f ),r . Therefore, by Lemma 2.10 and using that r ≥ ηε(q −1 Z m ) by Lemma 2.5, the distribution of Ue + f + c is within statistical distance 8ε of D q −1 Z m ,(α 2 ξ 2 +r 2 ) 1/2 . This shows that the second component of (4.2) is also distributed correctly. Finally, for the third component, by our assumption on U and the fact that the first coordinate of e is zero, z, f + c = z, Ue + f + c , and so the third component gives the inner product of the noise with z, as desired.
We now consider the case where the input is uniform, i.e., that A is uniform in T n×m q and b is independent and uniform in Tq ×T m−1 . We first observe that by Lemma 2.6, since α ≥ η ε/m (q −1 Z) (by Lemma 2.5), the distribution of (A, b) is within statistical distance ε/2 of the distribution of (A, e + e) where e is chosen uniformly in T m q , the first coordinate of e is zero, and its remaining m − 1 coordinates are chosen independently from Dα. So from now on assume our input is (A, e + e). The first component of (4.2) is uniform in T n×m q as before, and moreover, it is clearly independent of the other two. Moreover, since b = Ue + Ue + f and Ue ∈ T m q , the coset q −1 Z m − b is identical to q −1 Z m − (Ue + f ), and so c is distributed identically to the case of a valid LWE equation, and in particular is independent of e . This establishes that the third component of (4.2) is correctly distributed; moreover, since e is independent of the first and third components, and Ue is uniform in T m q (since U is unimodular), we get that the second component is uniform and independent of the other two, as desired.
We end this section by stating the standard reduction to the multi-secret (t ≥ 1) case of extended LWE. The proof is by a standard hybrid argument and is omitted.
Lemma 4.8 Let n, m, q, χ, Z be as in Definition 4.4 with χ efficiently sampleable, and let t ≥ 1 be an integer. Then there is an efficient (transformation) reduction from extLWEn,m,q,χ,Z to extLWE t n,m,q,χ,Z that reduces the advantage by a factor of t.
Reducing to binary secret
Lemma 4.9 Let k, n, m, q ∈ N, ε ∈ (0, 1/2), and δ, α, β, γ > 0 be such that n ≥ k log 2 q + 2 log 2 (1/δ), β ≥ 2 ln(2n(1 + 1/ε))/π/q, α = √ 2nβ, γ = √ nβ. Then there exist three efficient (transformation) reductions to binLWE n,m,q,≤α from extLWE m k,n,q,β,{0,1} n , LWE k,m,q,γ , and extLWE m k,n,q,β,{0 n } , such that if B1, B2, and B3 are the algorithms obtained by applying these reductions (respectively) to an algorithm A, then Pointing out the trivial (transformation) reduction from extLWE m k,n,q,β,{0,1} n to extLWE m k,n,q,β,{0 n } , the lemma implies the hardness of binLWE n,m,q,≤α based on the hardness of extLWE m k,n,q,β,{0,1} n and LWE k,m,q,γ . We note that our proof is actually more general, and holds for any binary distribution of min-entropy at least k log 2 q + 2 log 2 (1/δ), and not just a uniform binary secret as in the definition of binLWE.
Proof. The proof follows by a sequence of hybrids. Let k, n, m, q, ε, α, β, γ be as in the lemma statement. We consider z ← {0, 1}
n and e ← D This is because H1, H2 can be viewed as applying the same efficient transformation on the distributions (C, A, N T z) and (C,Â, N T z) respectively. Since distinguishing the latter distributions is exactly the extLWE m k,n,q,β,{0,1} n problem (where the columns of q · B are interpreted as the m secret vectors), the distinguisher B1 follows by first applying the aforementioned transformation and then applying A.
For the next hybrid, we define H3 = (Â, B T · s +ê), for s ← Z Eq. (4.7) is derived very similarly to Eq. (4.4): We notice that H4, H5 can be viewed as applying the same efficient transformation on the distributions (C,Â) and (C, A) respectively. Since distinguishing the latter distributions is exactly the extLWE m k,n,q,β,{0 n } problem (where the columns of q · B are interpreted as the m secret vectors), the distinguisher B3 follows by first applying the aforementioned transformation and then applying A. Putting together Eq. (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), the lemma follows.
